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 Return to Home
The blowback of the Global Financial Crisis and the rise of populism in Europe and America during the twenty-teens pushed
me to think more deeply about Japan’s political and economic trajectory since 1993 and its roots in the social and political
milieu of the late 1960s. In Mobilizing Japanese Youth, I establish how, despite the dominant narrative of countercultural
fashions that shape popular memory of the era, it was an underlying cultural conservatism of the Sixties Generation that
shaped their political consciousness from the late 1970s well into the twenty-first century.
I argue that Japan’s ‘transwar generation’ (born between 1890 and 1920) used nonstate institutions to actively shape the
political consciousness of the first generation of youth born after the end of the Second World War. Despite protestations
to the contrary, I found that the older transwar generation, who led Japan’s civic institutions for nearly five decades after
1945, shared a common set of conservative cultural mores that influenced the political consciousness of the generation of
young people who by the late 1960s were the demographic majority of voting-age adults.
Despite the dominant narrative of countercultural fashions that shape popular memory
of the era, it was an underlying cultural conservatism of the Sixties Generation that
shaped their political consciousness from the late 1970s well into the twenty-first
century.
I deploy an interdisciplinary toolkit to unpack how notions of class and gender shaped the discourses produced by, and for,
young men and women—from the weekly rants found in a sports gambling magazine to the political subject embedded
within the first commercial punk rock record album released in Japan.
I re-read how Japan was during the 1980s enthralled by the hubris of Hayekian economic discourses that had seemed since
the 1960s to promise a nation defined by middle-class affluence. Since the economic bubble burst in 1993, successive
government administrations have failed to solve the cascade of economic problems. For Japanese born after 1960, the
continually ailing economy has made it difficult to attain the “minimum cultured living,” which the 1947 constitution
guaranteed, and it has been nigh impossible for those born since 1980.
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Young people of latter generations, for whom the condition of precarity has been most pronounced since the bubble burst
in 1993, have been left to fend for themselves—unprepared, untrained, and unsupported—while they learn on their own
how to bear all the risks of economic decline through an endless string of impermanent jobs that have only limited or no
social benefits or statutory entitlements.  
 
Not uncommon to the myth of the ‘American Dream’, discourses of Japanese uniqueness (nihonjinron) promoted a
mythology of satisfied, hardworking, middle-class salarymen who supported suburban families managed by dedicated “good
wives and wise mothers” (ryōsai kenbo). This is an invented set of “traditional” social aspirations for men and women that
was first inscribed into state ideology during the late nineteenth century and survives without a significant material basis
into the twenty-first century. 
 
Even while many believed in the foundational myths associated with “harmonious workplace relations,” a white-collar nation
of male salarymen was supported by the denizens of a pink-collar ghetto who in turn belied a long history of conflict and
confrontation that gave flight to the affluent society in which the Japanese then lived. During the 1980s, and even after, it
was easy to think that Japan’s spectacular economic growth made it an exemplar of modern capitalism.
Discourses of Japanese uniqueness (nihonjinron) promoted a mythology of satisfied,
hardworking, middle-class salarymen who supported suburban families managed by
dedicated “good wives and wise mothers” (ryōsai kenbo).
By the mid-1990s, however, the hubris and certainty that drove the 1980s—“We have all the answers”—was gone: the
bubble burst, the Cold War ended, the population aged, rural areas hemorrhaged their populations and struggled to stay
alive. Also known as the Lost Decade, the economic malaise of the 1990s stretched well into the twenty-first century.  
 
Unemployment rates hovered around five percent all through the century’s first decade (the highest sustained levels of
unemployment since the early 1950s), while the average unemployment rate for individuals between the ages of fifteen and
twenty-four exceeded double that for the overall population.
Perhaps more troubling still is that the year-on-year aggregate wages for young people declined, and the ratio of part-time
temporary to full-time regular employment rose. Both scenarios are the result of an employment system that favored adults
who already had jobs over those who sought them. In the second decade of the twenty-first century, hundreds of thousands
of Japanese youths engaged with national politics through mass public protest, and through this, they aimed to change the
course of a parliament mired in the political mud of business as usual. 
 
Indeed, it appeared as if the system, as well as the bureaucrats, politicians, and business leaders who ran it, was incapable of
adapting to a changing world, and young people feared that since the 1990s, the system, and the social bargains that had
enabled it, had closed off rather than created the kinds of social and economic opportunities that had defined the early
postwar era.
It appeared as if the system, as well as the bureaucrats, politicians, and business leaders
who ran it, was incapable of adapting to a changed world.
While social critics and political pundits blamed the state for not developing practical welfare strategies for the future of the
nation, many of those same critics and pundits also insisted that it was the filial duty of this Lost Generation of “lazy” young
people to buckle down and work harder. These lazy young people, in reality, were the victims of a political mugging; the
postwar pathways from education to work that made Japan affluent were replaced by wave after wave of ill-prepared youth
with little or no economic prospects.
Harvard Sociologist Mary C. Brinton defines Japan’s Lost Generation as individuals who completed their formal education
and tried to enter employment between 1997 and 2003. It was during this period that unemployment rates among youth
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averaged between 8 and 10 percent, and the demand for full-time workers precipitously dropped. Indeed, the crux of this
generation’s precarity is irregular (hiseiki) employment, which more than 40 percent of young men and women in the age
cohort of fifteen-to-twenty-four-year-olds relied on by 2003.
Importantly, the government sought to use this generation’s inability to achieve the “normal” measure of permanent
employment as a lever for relabeling unconventional youth as the lazy, unmotivated adult children of affluent families,
despite significant evidence that the problem lies with the state’s withdrawal of the work-to-employment guarantee that had
underpinned the unprecedented economic growth prior to 1990.
These lazy young people, in reality, were the victims of a political mugging.
The resulting ideal-type notions of work, family, and political participation invoked attributes associated with manliness and
femininity that are more publicly associated with those advocated by the Far Right, while also underpinning the gender roles
that constrained the political and economic trajectories available to men and women of the Far Left.  
 
Much more significant, the failure of the older generation of political leaders to foster sufficient economic and political
opportunities for young people has created a bleak future for the succeeding generations of Japanese, who face unrelenting
underemployment and political irrelevance in a society likely to be dominated by a generation that will maintain its
demographic majority well into the 2020s.
Radical or not, the democratic voice of the contemporary generation of Japanese youth is muted by the political and
demographic longevity of the Sixties Generation—a generation that, once it was in charge, was quite satisfied with the
political status quo.
Radical or not, the democratic voice of the contemporary generation of Japanese youth
is muted by the political and demographic longevity of the Sixties Generation—a
generation that, once it was in charge, was quite satisfied with the political status quo.
*Featured image: Kaleidoscope showing an abstract object of blue and yellow, by Christian Liebel.
Cover image of Mobilizing Japanese
Youth.  
Read more about this book.
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